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The purpose of this research is to provide an approximation to the likely 
effects of the crisis on the Colombian economy and to the effectiveness 
of policy response.  For this, the most relevant transmission channels and 
policy measures are simulated in the setting of a static computable 
general equilibrium model (CGE).  The results obtained are interesting in 
their own right and are in line with what could be expected given the 
information available on the behavior of the Colombian economy. 
Furthermore, they call into question the effectiveness of governmental 
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1.  Introduction 
 
There is widespread interest in analyzing several dimensions of the impact of the 
international economic crisis.  As there has been signs of certain degree of “decoupling”, 
i.e. that emerging economies have become relatively independent from advanced 
economies’ business cycles (flouted for instance in Hebling et al, 2007), one of the areas in 
which research has focused is the type and degree of affect that these economies are 
experiencing from the crisis.  Analysts, for instance, fear that a prolonged and deep 
recession in the US may send emerging and developing economies in disarray 
notwithstanding evidence about decoupling (Kose et al, 2008). 
 
Short of the issue of whether there is decoupling in actuality, a valid and pressing question 
refers to what is the extent of the impact of the crisis on developing economies. What are its 
main transmission channels, how do they work through the economic structure, what policy 
measures have been undertaken, and what is their capability for effectively mitigating the 
negative effects of the crisis. 
 
The objective of this research is precisely to provide a partial assessment of the impact of 
the crisis on the Colombian economy and of the policy measures implemented by the 
government to try to smooth its negative effects.  The research is part of a broader effort led 
by the Poverty and Economic Policy Research Network (PEP), under the project “The 
Impact of the Crisis on Developing Countries, a CGE Evaluation.”  This particular piece of 
work was done under the auspices of the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI). 
 
As implied, the methodology of the project is based on the use of a Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) model, the PEP-1-1 model, so that a common language and 
methodological perspective is shared among all researchers.  For the Colombian study, a 
2005 SAM with 12 activities and 12 goods is employed.  Two scenarios are run.  First, an 
impact of the crisis scenario, in which the effects of two of the main transmission channels 
of the crisis are simulated, and second, an adopted policies scenario, in which the main 
policy measures implemented by the government are put to play simultaneously with the 
transmission channels.  Given the nature of the model, the relative importance of the 
channels for the particular case of Colombia, and the way they act on the economy, two 
transmission channels were selected for the simulation: changes in remittances, and 
changes in the behavior of international trade.  On the policy side, one measure is 
considered for analysis: the higher indebtedness that the government incurred in for 
increasing investment spending (particularly in infrastructure projects). 
 
The results obtained are interesting in their own right and are in line with what could be 
expected given the information available on the behavior of the Colombian economy. 
 
The paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, some relevant context on the crisis is 
provided.  Section 3 presents and discusses the recent behavior of the main transmission 
channels in Colombia, and outlines the type of policy response envisaged by the 
government.  Section 4 is devoted to presenting the objectives of the research, the modeling 3 
 
strategy, and the scenarios implemented.  Section 5 provides a summary description of the 
Colombian economy.  Then, results are presented in section 6, and, lastly, some concluding 
comments are the topic of section 7. 
 
2.  Context 
 
The current global financial and economic crisis is the most serious threat that the world 
has faced in over half a century.  According to Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2010) during 
the first ten months of the crisis, world industrial production, trade, and stock markets 
declined faster than in 1929-1930.  The severity of the crisis can be appreciated from 
subsequent updates of the key forecasts made by the IMF’s World Economic Outlook for 
2009 as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  IMF’s economic growth forecasts for 2009* 
 
Date  World Output  Advanced economies  Emergent and 
developing economies 
October 2008  3.0  0.5  6.1 
April 2009  -1.3  -3.8  1.6 
July 2009  -1.4  -3.8  1.5 
October 2009  -1.1  -3.4  1.7 
January 2010**  -0.8  -3.2  2.1 
  *IMF’s World Economic Outlook (2009); percentage changes year over year. 
**estimated (not projection) 
 
The occurrence of figures slightly better than expected until October 2009 is basically a 
consequence of the implementation of sizeable stimulus packages adopted by numerous 
economies, but especially by the developed ones.  The global economy is expected to 
gradually return to positive growth in 2010 (the IMF forecasts 3.9 percent growth at the 
global level).  However, it has been observed that recovery is uneven across regions, 
spreading from emerging economies to advanced economies, where its pace is expected to 
be lower than in previous crisis. 
 
In spite of the fact that developing countries experienced a lower growth decline than 
others, the impact of the crisis on poverty reduction is deemed to be important (Chen and 
Ravallion, 2009).  As their relatively weak integration into the global financial system 
seemed to have sheltered most developing countries from the financial crisis, for these 
economies the effects are felt mainly as a real sector crisis.  Furthermore, for most of them 
this may be basically characterized as a “trade crisis” (Evenett and Hoekman, 2009).   
According to the IMF (2010), world trade volume (goods and services) shrunk 12.3 percent 
in 2009.  The volume of imports by advanced economies and by emerging and developing 
economies decreased 12.2 and 13.5, respectively, while the volume of exports decreased 
12.1 and 11.7.  Furthermore, international prices have declined.  Oil’s price decreased 36.1 
percent while nonfuel commodities’ prices declined 18.9 percent in average (IMF, 2010). 
 
The macroeconomic impacts of the economic crisis in developing countries largely depend 
on the magnitude and length of the recession in developed countries.  On the other hand, its 4 
 
distributive impacts depend upon the particular economic structure in each case and the 
way it interacts with the international economy.  It has been pointed out that the main 
transmission channels delivering the effects of the crisis from the global to the national 
economy level are, in the case of developing economies, international trade, capital flows 
and investment, remittances, and international aid (Decaluwe and Flores, 2009). 
 
3.  Transmission Channels and Governmental response in the Case of Colombia 
 
Table 2, below, shows the recent evolution of international aid, remittances, foreign direct 
investment, and trade in Colombia.  The figures cover the period 2000-2008.  For each 
variable, the first row shows the variable level in million US dollars and the second row 
refers to its value as a percentage of GDP.  From there it can be appreciated that 
international aid is low as compared to the values of the other variables considered.  As a 
share of GDP, it represented 0.28%, as average, during the period 2000-2007, with a peak 
of 0.56% in 2001.  These figures include aid from the US in the framework of the Plan 
Colombia Program, a cooperation agreement between the US and the Colombian 
governments for strengthening the fight against illicit crops cultivation and drug trafficking.  
Around 60% of total funds assigned to the Plan Colombia are devoted to military aid. 
 
Table 2.  Recent behavior of the crisis’ main transmission channels in Colombia 
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
International 
aid* 
154 521 341 281 301 311 315 348  N.A. 
0.16 0.56 0.37 0.31 0.26 0.22 0.19 0.17   
Remittances*  1,578 2,021 2,454 3,060 3,170 3,314 3,890 4,493 4,842 
1.68 2.18 2.64 3.34 2.78 2.29 2.39 2.16 1.99 
FDI*  2,436 2,542 2,134 1,720 3,016  10,252 6,656 9,049  10,583 
2.59 2.74 2.30 1.88 2.65 7.09 4.09 4.35 4.35 
Exports (goods 
and services)* 
16,356 15,296 14,586 15,688 19,868 24,972 28,978 35,061  N.A. 
17.39 16.47 15.70 17.11 17.45 17.27 17.83 16.87   
Exports 
(goods)* 
13,158 12,330 11,975 13,129 16,731 21,190 24,391 29,991 37,626 
13.99 13.28 12.89 14.32 14.69 14.66 15.00 14.43 15.47 
Imports (goods 
and services)* 
17,750 19,195 19,487 20,503 24,196 30,410 35,720 43,723  N.A. 
18.87 20.67 20.98 22.36 21.25 21.03 21.97 21.04   
Imports 
(goods)* 
11,538 12,834 12,699 13,890 16,748 21,204 26,162 32,897 39,669
12.27 13.82 13.67 15.15 14.71 14.67 16.09 15.83 16.31 
*In each case: figures in the first row are million US dollars, and figures in the second row are percentages of 
GDP. 
Sources: National Statistics Office (DANE) and Central Bank (Banco de la República). 
 
As in other developing countries, the significance of remittances has been growing in 
Colombia.  In 2008, remittances were more than threefold their size in 2000 and 
represented the third largest source of foreign currency, after oil and coal exports (not 
accounting for FDI).  As an average, remittances represented almost 2.4% of GDP during 
the period 2000-2008. 
 
FDI shows significant and fluctuating values along the time period considered.  It has 
experienced important growth along the last part of the period, reaching in 2008 a value 
more than six fold the lowest one (in 2003).  As average, FDI has concentrated in the 5 
 
mining and oil sectors (48%); followed by the manufacturing industry (19%), the financial 
sector (12%), and the transport and telecommunications sectors (11%).  In recent years, the 
government has aggressively pursued an increase in FDI by means of fiscal stimulus 
programs.  Along the period 2000-2008, FDI has represented the equivalent of 3.6% of 
GDP. 
 
In terms of its size and share of GDP, trade is by far the biggest of the transmission 
channels.  As average, exports of goods and services represented 17% of GDP during 2000-
2008, while imports of goods and services represented 21%.  If only trade in goods is 
considered, both exports and imports represented 29% of GDP between 2000 and 2008.  
Colombian exports are highly concentrated in a few products and in a few markets.  In 
2008, exports to the US represented more than 37% of total goods exports, followed by 
exports to Venezuela (16%) and the European Union (13%).  In terms of products, oil 
represented almost 25% of total exports, while coal exports amounted to more than 13%, 
oil products almost 8%, chemical products almost 6%, and coffee 5%. 
 
As in many other developing countries, policy response in Colombia has limited to some 
sort of counter-cyclical measures, mainly related to interest rates management, 
prioritization of already planned government expending on infrastructure, and 
precautionary securing of public debt financing. 
 
Measures include the undoing of recent credit tightening by the Central Bank.  From April 
2006 to the beginning of the second semester of 2008, the Central Bank increased interest 
rates from 6% to 10%, in the face of increased governmental expending, high foreign 
capital inflows, and an expansionary credit market. To try to smooth the impact of the crisis 
on the economy, since the late 2008 and during 2009, the Central Bank decreased the 
interest rate by 650 basis points, leading to a 3.5% interest rate, the lowest in recent 
Colombian history. 
 
Also, the Central Bank dismantled the requirement for commercial banks to marginally 
increase the amount of deposits they have to keep from lending to the public (an additional, 
marginal, mandatory bank reserve) and the requirement for borrowers in the international 
market to deposit in the Central Bank a share of the amounts borrowed.  These measures 
were undertaken in the second semester of 2008. 
 
Additionally, the financial regulatory agency (Superintendence of Finance) issued new 
guidelines regarding management of credit risk on the part of commercial banks and 
increased the amount of funds banks need to keep for facing unexpected adverse 
circumstances. 
 
The central government took measures to face the likely decrease in government revenue.  
It obtained Congress approval to increase the fiscal deficit by 0.6% of GDP (around 
US$1,430 billion, getting to 3.2% of GDP in total), as well as to postpone expending in 
about the same amount (shifting expending priority toward programmed infrastructure 
projects, social programs, and productive incentives programs).  Furthermore, a Flexible 
Credit Line -FCL (worth about US$11,000 million) was contracted in May 2009 with the 6 
 
IMF to secure coverage against adverse balance of payments shocks and for increasing the 
scope for countercyclical measures. 
 
The IMF’s October 2009 review of the Colombian economy under the FCL arrangement 
(IMF, 2009a) indicated that the global environment had improved as compared with the 
conditions prevailing at the time the FCL was negotiated.  Spreads had narrowed, more for 
Colombia than for other Latin American economies, the stock market showed clear signs of 
recovery, and commodity prices were recovering.  The external current account deficit for 
2009 was expected to stay at 3% of GDP, basically due to a lower than previously expected 
decline in exports and remittances.  The financial system showed resilience as non-
performing loans increased marginally (0.6%) in the 12 months running from September 
2008 to August 2009, while the fiscal deficit increased at the expected pace. 
 
In sum, the IMF’s report showed a general situation better than expected at the beginning of 
2009.  This picture is confirmed as judged by the press release following a new IMF’s 
review held in February 2010.  According to it “The Colombian economy is showing signs 
of recovery [and] Economic policies before and after the global crisis were appropriate to 
ameliorate the impact on Colombia. The central bank lowered its policy rate by 650 basis 
points since late 2008 and fiscal policy was countercyclical. The flexible exchange rate and 
the sound financial system were also instrumental in mitigating the effects of the external 
shocks.” (IMF, 2010) 
 
Figures available on the behavior of the main transmission channels show that although 
better than initially expected, the impact of the crisis is significant.  There are no readily 
available figures on the behavior of international aid in 2008 and 2009.  However, as the 
bulk of aid comes from the Plan Colombia Program and it has been kept in place with 
relatively minor budgetary adjustments, it is reasonable to expect that international aid has 
been stable during these two years. 
 
On the other hand, remittances decreased along most months during 2009, as compared to 
2008.  Only February and November showed remittances levels slightly above the figures 
registered in the same months in 2008.  The biggest decrease is found in July, when its 
value dropped 23% with respect to the same month in 2008.  In total, in 2009 remittances 
declined 14.4%, in current US dollars. 
 
The behavior of FDI during 2009 was as follows.  As compared with the same period a year 
before, FDI declined almost 21% in the first quarter while a recovery is found during the 
second quarter in which an increase of 11.1% is registered.  The third quarter of the year 
shows a marked slump with a decline of 50.7%, while the fourth quarter goes down even 
deeper with a 64.6% decline.  For the whole year FDI fell almost 31.5%. 
 
While currently there are no figures available for international trade in services in 2009, 
trade in goods showed a significant declined in value terms.  In current US dollars, 
Colombian exports decreased 12.7% and imports declined 17.1%.  In terms of volumes, 
exports increased 9.2% while imports decreased 6.6%.  This means that, aside trade 
shrinkage in value, the Colombian economy experienced deterioration in its terms of trade.  
While, in aggregate, export prices declined 20%, import prices declined 11.2%. 7 
 
 
The behavior of real GDP along 2009 can be characterized as follows.  The first three 
quarters of the year showed year on year declines of 0.5%, 0.3%, and 0.2%, respectively, 
and quarter on quarter increases of 0.1%, 0.8%, and 0.4%.  In turn, the fourth quarter 
showed a significant recovery.  It registered a 2.5% increase on a year on year basis and a 
1.1% increase on a quarter on quarter basis.  The aggregate figure for the year turned out to 
be a 0.4% increase in GDP.  The sectors with the highest contributions to this increase were 
construction, mining, and financial services. 
 
4.  Objective, Modeling Strategy, Data, and Scenarios 
 
The purpose of this research is to provide an approximation to the likely effects of the crisis 
on the Colombian economy and to the effectiveness of policy response.  For this, the most 
relevant transmission channels are considered in the setting of a static computable general 
equilibrium model (CGE).  Given the static nature of the model and the relative importance 
of transmission channels in the case of Colombia, only the behavior of remittances and 
international trade are considered in the simulations. 
 
The static Poverty and Economic Policy standard model (PEP-1-1) by Decaluwe et al 
(2009) is used here.  Minor changes were made to the model to adjust it to the 2005 SAM 
available for Colombia.  The model has two production factors: capital and labor.  The 
latter is divided in four types: rural unskilled, rural skilled, urban unskilled, and urban 
skilled.  Each activity in the model uses both production factors.  The SAM was aggregated 
to 12 activities and 12 commodities (the original SAM has 59 activities and 59 
commodities) to emphasize the trade structure of the economy.  Activities produce more 
than one commodity and several commodities are produced by more than one activity.  
Households are break down in income deciles so as to have a deeper look at the 
distributional consequences of the crisis.  No further discussion of the model is pursued 
here, as only minor adjustments were made to PEP-1-1 and its structure is described in 
detail in Decaluwe et al (2009). 
 
As mentioned above, only remittances and trade were chosen among the transmission 
channels for simulation.  International aid was disregarded as a transmission channel of 
importance given that its size is relatively small for the economy.  Furthermore, the bulk of 
aid comes from the implementation of the Plan Colombia which is relatively independent 
of the crisis in the sense that its political nature and pre-committed levels (to certain point) 
tend to isolate it from the vagaries of the crisis.  Admittedly, there are aid programs that are 
likely to suffer from budgetary reductions driven by the crisis.  However, they tend to be 
relatively small and highly focused on certain population groups.  This is what happens, for 
instance, with programs run by the World Food Program that caters vulnerable groups, 
mostly displaced population, that tend to be marginal to markets behavior. 
 
FDI is potentially an important channel in the transmission of the effects of the crisis.  
However, in the context of a static model its role is basically one of improving (or 
worsening) the ability of the economy to cover a potential deterioration in the current 
account in the face of trade changes.  As the IMF’s October 2009 review of the Colombian 
economy states, the composition of the Colombian capital account shifted in a way 8 
 
favorable to the economy.  Public sector roll-over rates were higher than anticipated, 
including bond emissions by public sector enterprises, and the medium-term roll over rates 
for the private sector behaved according to expectations and have been partly used for 
foreign assets accumulation.  As a consequence, the IMF estimated that FDI will largely 
finance the current account balance.  In light of this, it was decided that shocking FDI was 
not a reasonable proposition for our purposes. 
 
As mentioned, in current US dollars, remittances decreased by 14.4% (about US$700 
million) between 2008 and 2009.  Contrary to what may be expected, remittances do not 
necessarily benefit the most the lower income households.  As international migration is 
costly and employment opportunities abroad are positively correlated with relative human 
capital, migrants from households in the lowest income levels are scarcer than those 
belonging to higher income levels when the prevalence of migration is relatively low 
(Mckenzie and Rapaport, 2004; quoted in Hernandez, 2008).  Furthermore, migrants’ 
capability for sending remittances increases with their human capital and this may translate 
in higher remittances levels to higher income households.  According to Gaviria (2004), 
Colombian migrants to the US have at least three more years of schooling than their 
counterparts in Colombia and earn twice as much.  Although lower income migrants have 
the more to gain, higher income migrants have the legal and economic means to migrate. 
 
According to Hernandez (2008) estimations, the three lowest household income deciles get 
2.2% of total remittances, while the following three get 14.4%, income deciles 6 to 9 get 
38%, and the top 10% of households gets more than 45% of total remittances.  Urrutia 
(2003) posits that remittances tend to be countercyclical due to the fact that are destined to 
cover the beneficiary household’s subsistence expenses.  It also claims that migrants tend to 
increase hours worked and remit more during periods in which recipient households 
experience income shocks.  Other related evidence provided by Hernandez (2008) tends to 
support also the hypothesis that remittances income can be regarded as part of the recipient 
household’s permanent income. 
 
In relative terms, trade is the biggest of the crisis transmission channels and presumably the 
one that may have the largest impacts.  As mentioned, for most developing countries it is 
deemed that the international crisis is felt mainly as a trade crisis. In the case of Colombia 
exports and imports contracted in value in 2009, but exports increased in volume (a fact 
determined by the composition of Colombian exports) while imports decreased in volume.  
Activities in the model are aggregated in such a way as to better reflect the composition of 
Colombian trade and trade impacts.  Table 3 shows the sectoral structure of Colombian 












Table 3.  Structure of Colombian Trade in Goods 2008 
 
Sector  Exports. Share in:  Imports. Share in: 
Value Volume Value Volume 
Agriculture  13,5   0,9   6,2   27,9  
Coal  13,4   68,7   0,0   0,0  
Oil  24,7   16,7   0,6   1,3  
Minerals  6,5   2,0   0,5   4,6  
Processed oil  7,7   6,4   3,9   8,7  
Chemical products   7,5   1,4   19,5   20,3  
Manufacturing  20,7   3,6   25,2   30,8  
Machinery and equipment  4,4   0,2   33,6   4,3  
Transport equipment  1,5   0,1   10,0   2,2  
Source: author’s calculation based on data from the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Tourism 
 
Agriculture has significant participation in both export and import trade.  Agricultural 
exports are dominated by coffee, cut flowers and bananas, while agricultural imports 
consist mainly of cereals.  Coal is the second largest (individual) Colombian export in value 
and the largest in volume.  Oil is the largest Colombian export (as a model sector and 
individually considered) in value and the second largest in volume.  Minerals include 
nickel, emeralds, and other minerals not specified.  Processed oil is the fourth largest 
(individual) Colombian export and the fifth largest (individual) import.  Chemical products 
are significant as both an export and an import item.  On the export side, these exports are 
basically aimed at the regional market, notably the Andean Community.  The 
manufacturing sector is a wide combination of subsectors. It includes all agroindustrial 
activities, as well as textiles, apparel, paper, editorial products, shoes and leather products, 
plastic products, metallurgy and metallic products, and other manufacturing not specified.  
Machinery and equipment is, by far, the largest Colombian import.  It comprises machinery 
for general use (motors, turbines, pumps, elevators, and furnaces) as well as machinery for 
specific purposes (agriculture, metallurgic, mining, food and beverages, textiles, and 
domestic appliances), and other machinery (office equipment, computers, electric 
equipment, communications equipment, medical and optical equipment, and watches).   
Lastly, transport equipment is the third largest (individual) Colombian import. 
 
Two scenarios are implemented for reaching the proposed objectives.  First, an impact of 
the crisis scenario, and second an adopted policies scenario.  In what follows both are 
discussed in turn. 
 
The impact of the crisis scenario is run on the lines depicted above.  The economy is 
shocked through “observed” changes in remittances and exports.  Remittances are lowered 
by 14.4% with respect to the benchmark, corresponding to the behavior actually observed.  
However, since there is no information on the way this drop is shared among recipient 
households (and there is no data to make any inference about it), it is assumed that all 
household types are affected in the same proportion.  As implied above, remittances income 
is treated as part of households’ permanent income and changes in this income source affect 
the whole set of consumption/savings decisions. 10 
 
 
On the other hand, export trade is shocked both in terms of exported volumes and in prices.  
Actual information is used for determining the size of the shocks.  Data from the Ministry 
of Trade, Industry, and Tourism is used to estimate changes in exported volumes for the 
sector groupings employed in this research.  Regarding prices, in view that there is no 
available information on international prices at the level of aggregation needed, it was 
decided to assume that in all cases Colombia acts as a small economy and that changes in 
implicit prices reflect to an acceptable degree changes in international prices.  As this 
approach may entail difficulties (for instance, it may happen that the gap between FOB and 
international prices changes due to market conditions and that price transmission is less 
than perfect) it seems reasonable to use the behavior of implicit FOB prices as a proxy for 
changes in international prices, especially given that price changes must correspond to the 
particular basket of products at the interior of each sector grouping (a condition in practice 
impossible to achieve using available data). 
 
Therefore, changes in export volumes and values were used to estimate changes in implicit 
FOB prices, and the latter are used as proxies for changes in international prices.  This has 
the additional advantage that as export volumes and values are constructed from customs 
data, they reflect the behavior of price fluctuations along the whole year, instead of 
applying a “flat”, uniform, price change to the aggregate of monthly exports.  Table 4 
shows the percentage changes in trade volumes and prices that are used to shock the 
economy, for each sector. 
 
Table 4.  Percentage Changes in Export Volumes and (Estimated) Prices for Colombia 
during 2009 
 
Sector  Exports Imports 
Change in Volume  Change in Price  Change in Price 
Agriculture  3,1 -13,9 -27,0 
Chemical  products  14,0 -25,6 -10,9 
Coal 8,1  -0,7  -24,5 
Coffee -23,7  6,8  5,1 
Machinery and equipment  -19,6  5,7  14,9 
Manufactures  -1,9 -31,8 -11,4 
Minerals -30,3  38,5  -35,2 
Oil 32,1  -52,7  76,8 
Processed  oil  -14,1 -12,7 -57,2 
Transport equipment  -43,2  -11,6  -2,3 
Source: author’s calculation based on data from the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Tourism 
 
As exports tend to concentrate in a few firms it is unlikely that they can easily switch 
production between exports and the domestic market in the short-run.  Furthermore, in 
several cases product quality differs between these two markets.  In light of this, it is 
assumed that there are short-term rigidities for switching production between supply for the 
domestic market and exports.  A CET elasticity of 0.5 is used to reflect such rigidity.  On 
the importers side, a CES elasticity of 2 is used for substituting domestic production for 
imports, as it is deemed that in the demand side substitutability is higher, even in the short-11 
 
run.  Final demand parameters (LES) are calibrated according to household survey data, 
using the same survey on which the micro-SAM was constructed. 
 
Regarding factor markets, capital is assumed to be sector specific as a short-term scenario 
is run.  As for labor, a low elasticity of substitution among labor types is assumed.  The 
Colombian economy has a relatively high and stable unemployment rate.  Between 2001 
and 2008, the annual average unemployment rate was 13.1% with a coefficient of variation 
of 0.1.  Between December 2008 and December 2009 unemployment increased 0.7% (from 
10.6% to 11.3%).  Being unemployment a “structural” feature of the Colombian economy 
and having increased marginally (in aggregate terms) during 2009, labor markets are 
modeled as wage flexible since most adjustment may be expected to come from wages and 
not from greater unemployment (given the large size of the informal sector). 
 
The adopted policies scenario aims at representing the most important policy responses 
adopted before the crisis.  As a summary, policy response in Colombia rested on: (a) an 
important reduction in interest rates charged by the Central Bank (a 650 basis points total 
reduction), and (b) a counter cyclical fiscal policy, based on a deficit increase incurred in 
for avoiding reductions in investment.  The Colombian public debt increased to 4.6% of 
GDP during 2009 (the public external debt increased 255.4% and the public internal debt 
increased 0.15%), allowing for an increase in public sector demand of 10.2%.  From these 
measures, the first is less amenable to be simulated with the kind of model used here and 
there is no readily available information on the real drop in commercial interest rates that 
was induced by the Central Bank.  In light of this, it was decided to model only the impact 
of the second policy. 
 
For this, it is assumed that public operating expenses (current government expenses on 
goods and services) are kept constant while Rest of the World savings is allowed to expand 
in a predetermined proportion, to reflect the increase in public foreign debt.  In turn, the 
increase in Rest of the World savings is mainly channeled to investment in infrastructure so 
as to capture the 10.2% increase in government investment in this sector.  These shocks are 
added to the ones documented above to reflect the impact of the crisis and the same closure 
rules are followed. 
 
5.  Stylized Facts on the Colombian Economy 
 
As shown in Table 5, in terms of value added, the Colombian economy is overwhelmingly 
a services economy.  The services sector
1 accounts for more than 61% of total value added 
and is followed in importance by the manufacturing (near 11%), and agricultural sectors 
(more than 9%).  Value added represents almost 64% of the total value of the services 
sector.  However, the highest shares of value added in total sectoral value are found in the 
minerals, coffee, and agricultural sectors.  On the opposite side, the lowest shares of value 




1 It includes domestic services, commerce, reparation and maintenance, hotels, transport, postage, financial 
services, restaurants, rentals, education, social services, recreation, and public administration. 12 
 
Regarding its contribution to investment (gross fixed capital formation and inventories), the 
infrastructure sector is by far the largest, with a 61.4% share.  It is followed by machinery 
and equipment and transport equipment, with 20.6% and 8.5%, respectively.  Lastly, the 
sectors with the largest capital-labor ratios are coal, oil, and chemical products.  The first 
two are among the largest contributors to Colombian export value.  On the other side, the 
sectors with the lowest ratios are agriculture, coffee, and minerals. 
 
Table  5.  Sectoral composition of value added, trade, and investment in Colombia. 
2005 
 
Sector  Value added 
share 
Value added share 
in total value 
Investment* Capital-
labor ratio
Agriculture 9,3  68,1  1,5  0,06 
Chemical products  1,8  31,4  0,4  2,40 
Coal 1,4  65,4  0,1  6,61 
Coffee 1,5  76,4  -0,2  0,06 
Infrastructure 6,2  44,2  61,4  0,86 
Machinery and equipment  0,6  29,7  20,6  0,88 
Manufactures 10,7  30,5  4,4  0,97 
Minerals 1,7  83,7  0,6  0,36 
Oil 3,2  64,3  0,1  5,39 
Processed oil  1,8  39,3  0,1  2,05 
Services 61,4  63,7  2,7  0,57 
Transport equipment  0,3  13,5  8,5  1,24 
*includes gross capital formation and changes in inventories 
Source: Colombian 2005 SAM 
 
Table 6 shows the sectoral composition of labor demand by labor type.  From there, it can 
be appreciated that the services sector is the largest employer of rural skilled workers and 
urban workers.  Employment of rural skilled workers concentrates around the services 
sector (more than 71% of total employment for this labor type) and the agricultural sector 
(more than 20%).  In turn, rural unskilled workers find employment the most in the 
agricultural sector (more than 66%) and then, with small differences, in the coffee and 
services sectors.  Almost 79% of urban skilled workers are employed in the services sector, 
while more than 62% of urban unskilled workers find employment there too.  The second 
largest employer of urban skilled workers is the manufacturing sector, followed by the 
agricultural and the infrastructure sectors.  Finally, the second largest employer of urban 











Table 6.  Sectoral composition of labor demand by labor type in Colombia. 2005 
 
Sector 









Agriculture 20,3  66,2  4,3  9,9 
Chemical products  0,3  0,1  1,3  0,7 
Coal 0,0  0,2  0,3  0,3 
Coffee 2,2  10,7  0,7  1,4 
Infrastructure 3,2  2,0  4,2  7,7 
Machinery and equipment  0,0  0,0  0,6  0,6 
Manufactures 2,9  2,9  6,0  13,5 
Minerals 0,0  6,7  0,0  2,7 
Oil 0,0  0,1  1,3  0,5 
Processed oil  0,0  0,0  2,0  0,3 
Services 71,2  11,1  78,9  62,2 
Transport equipment  0,0  0,0  0,3  0,2 
Source: Colombian 2005 SAM 
 
From a sectoral perspective, labor is predominantly rural unskilled and urban unskilled, in 
this order, in the agricultural and coffee sectors, while it is urban unskilled and rural 
unskilled in the minerals sector.  It is predominantly urban skilled and urban unskilled, in 
this order, in the chemical products, oil, processed oil, transport equipment, and services 
sectors.  It is predominantly urban unskilled and urban skilled in the infrastructure and 
manufacturing sectors.  Labor is approximately (and predominantly) balanced between 
urban unskilled and urban skilled types in the coal, and machinery and equipment sectors.  
There are no sectors whose predominant labor type is rural skilled. 
 
Finally, it is useful to have an idea about the composition of households’ income.  Table 7 
shows the relevant information.  From there, it is clear that there is high income inequality 
in Colombia.  Households in decile 10 earn almost 37 times the income that households in 
decile one get.  The figure reduces to almost seven times when decile 10 income is 
compared to the joint income of households in deciles one to three.  As for the composition 
of income, labor is the main income source for all household types.  Its contribution ranges 
from 86.4% for households in decile one to 61.5% for households in decile 10, decreasing 
monotonically as we move from low income deciles to high income deciles.  Capital 
income shows the lowest contribution to total income across households.  It is the highest 
for high income households (9% for decile 10 households) and the lowest for low income 
households (0.8% in the decile one).  Lastly, transfer income is the second largest income 
source making up, as average, for almost 22% of households income.  As in the case of 
capital income, there is the tendency for transfer income to increase as we move from low 
income to high income households.  Remittances income is relatively low for all household 
types.  As a proportion of transfer income, it represents 11.5% as average, showing the 
lowest share in the case of households in decile one and the highest shares for households 









Share in total 
income 
Share of income from:  Share of 
remittances in 
transfer income  Capital Labor  Transfers 
1 1,2  0,8  86,4 12,8  7,1 
2 2,2  1,1  85,8 13,1  9,0 
3 3,0  1,5  83,1 15,4  8,2 
4 4,0  1,2  79,2 19,6  9,4 
5 5,0  1,6  78,4 20,0 16,2 
6 6,2  1,3  75,6 23,1 16,8 
7 8,0  2,1  74,2 23,7 11,5 
8 11,4  2,9  66,9  30,1  13,8 
9 16,1  3,3  65,6  31,2  11,3 
10 43,0  9,0  61,5  29,5  11,8 
Source: Colombian 2005 SAM 
 
6.  Simulations Results 
 
6.1  Impact of the crisis scenario 
 
Results from the impact of the crisis scenario are discussed below.  Table 8 presents 
changes in quantities exported and in export values arising as a consequence of the trade 
shock.  As can be appreciated, the direction and magnitude of changes follow the pattern 
imposed by the trade shock.  In general, coal, coffee, machinery and equipment, mineral, 
and services show increases in quantities exported.  With the exception of machinery and 
equipment this is also the direction that changes in export value have for this set of sectors.  
However, FOB prices decline for most of these sectors and positive changes in export value 
are due to more than offsetting increases in quantities exported.  The only cases in which 
FOB prices increase correspond to coal and minerals.  Agriculture shows decreases in 
quantities exported and export value.  The rest of sectors (chemical products, manufactures, 
oil, processed oil, and transport equipment) show decreases in both quantities exported and 
exported value. 
 
These changes are in consonance with the size and direction of the shocks imposed.
2  In 
terms of impact on the economy, the most significant changes are those belonging to the 
sectors with the largest trade shares: manufactures, oil, coal, and agriculture.  In total, 








2 It must be remembered that services trade was not shocked due to lack of data. 15 
 
Table 8.  Percentage changes in traded quantities and trade values. Scenario impact of 
the crisis. 
 
Sector  Quantity 
exported 
Export value  Quantity 
imported 
Import value 
Agriculture -1.1  -13.0  18.3  -11.9 
Chemical products  -3.8  -22.1  -5.2  -16.1 
Coal 6.6  6.6  21.8  -6.9 
Coffee 20.1  2.2  -26.3  -22.2 
Machinery and equipment  10.2  -0.5  -29.6  -22.8 
Manufactures -11.9  -36.6  -8.3  -19.3 
Minerals 26.2  29.9  -22.0  -47.9 
Oil -16.0  -50.2  -80.4  -67.0 
Processed oil  -10.2  -23.3  83.7  -16.6 
Services 9.4  4.6  -26.8  -26.8 
Transport equipment  -26.3  -42.8  -21.1  -23.9 
Source: model simulation 
 
Table 8 also shows similar information for the case of imports.  As international import 
prices are exogenous and there are no changes in tariffs or other taxes affecting imports, 
changes in CIF prices (with respect to international prices) arise only as a consequence of 
movements in margins prices.  Most sectors tend to show decreases in imported volumes as 
well as in imported values.  The exceptions to this behavior are agriculture, coal, and 
processed oil, whose imported quantities increase.  As only coffee, machinery and 
equipment, and oil show positive price shocks, the general situation for these products is 
that changes in quantities imported determine changes in import values.  All sectors register 
declines in import values. 
 
The broad changes in the import side are determined by machinery and equipment, 
manufactures, chemical products, and transport equipment.  As an aggregate, quantities 
imported decline by 12.7%, while import values decline 23.9%. 
 
The third piece of information fitting in this description is supply of domestic products for 
the domestic market.  Table 9 presents the relevant data.  Most sectors show declines in 
quantities supplied and market value.  Only coffee shows increases in both variables, while 
machinery and equipment, and services show increases in quantities and declines in market 
value, reflecting declining prices.  The structure of the domestic market for domestically 
produced goods is dominated by the services sector.  It accounts for almost 58% of total 
domestic demand, followed by manufactures (18.8%), infrastructure (8.9%), and 
agriculture (6.6%); the rest of sectors account for the remaining 7.8%.  Therefore, changes 
in supply to the domestic market are determined by the behavior of these four sectors.  As a 







Table 9.  Percentage changes in quantities supplied to the domestic market and market 
values. Scenario impact of the crisis. 
 
Sector  Quantity 
supplied 
Value 
Agriculture -4.4  -24.1 
Chemical products  -0.2  -14.5 
Coal -2.3  -5.8 
Coffee 18.7  14.9 
Infrastructure -16.5  -44.9 
Machinery and equipment  8.8  -0.9 
Manufactures -2.6  -18.6 
Minerals -6.1  -16.1 
Oil -3.5  -35.5 
Processed oil  -20.0  -54.8 
Services 2.8  -7.6 
Transport equipment  -17.8  -31.9 
Source: model simulation 
 
A general comment is in order with respect to the behavior of the variables described 
above.  Sectors with high exposition to trade, say more than 50% of exports as a proportion 
of domestic demand or more than 50% of imports as a proportion of domestic demand
3, 
tend to show changes in trade variables that are commensurate with the size of the trade 
shocks and this generates relatively large changes in supply to the domestic market (as it 
has relatively low shares as a production destiny).  Sectors with the lowest expositions to 
trade tend to show smaller relative changes in domestic supply.  However, the size of 
changes in supply to the domestic market depends upon the size of the trade shock. 
 
As the agricultural sector is the largest employer of rural unskilled workers and output of 
the sector shrinks, wages tend to fall.  The other sectors important for demand of this labor 
type (services and coffee, which make up short of a third of demand by agriculture) show 
increases in output ameliorating the negative impact on wages.  As a result, wages for this 
labor type fall almost 18%.  Regarding rural skilled labor, in spite of the fact that the largest 
demander of this labor type (services) increases output (in 2.9%), wages fall.  The reason is 
twofold.  First, prices for services decline by a bigger proportion making output value 
shrink.  Second, the second largest employer of rural skilled labor (agriculture) decreases in 
output.  The fall in wages is in the order of 10%. 
 
On the urban side, the following results are attained.  Output of the two largest employers 
of urban unskilled workers (services and manufactures) move in opposite directions.   
However, in value terms both sectors decline inducing a 17.6% fall in wages.  Lastly, the 
behavior of urban skilled labor’s wages is largely determined by the behavior of the 
services sector (which demands almost 79% of this labor type).  As the value of this 
sector’s output decreases, wages for urban skilled workers do the same; they decrease by 
14.4%. 
                                                            
3 On the export side these are coal, coffee, minerals, oil, and processed oil. On the import side they are: 
chemical products, machinery and equipment, and transport equipment. 17 
 
 
Table 10 shows percentage changes in labor demand by sector and labor type.  As partly 
mentioned above, the most important changes regarding rural unskilled labor are those 
arising in agriculture and services.  The dynamics essentially consists in that the 
agricultural and infrastructure sectors expel workers while the coffee, minerals, and 
services sectors absorb them.  In the case of rural skilled workers, the services sector 
increases its absorption of this labor type while the agricultural sector expels workers.   
Changes shown by the infrastructure and coffee sectors are sizeable in relative terms, but 
both sectors have small employment shares for this type of labor (as shown in Table 6 
above). 
 
Table 10.  Percentage changes in labor demand by sector. Scenario impact of the crisis. 
 
Sector  Rural unskilled  Rural skilled  Urban unskilled  Urban skilled 
Agriculture -5.8  -7.5  -5.8  -6.6 
Chemical products  -4.7  -6.4  -4.7  -5.4 
Coal 53.7    53.6  52.4 
Coffee 25.7  23.4  25.7  24.7 
Infrastructure -29.3  -30.6  -29.3  -29.8 
Machinery and equipment  12.9    12.8  12.0 
Manufactures -6.8  -8.5  -6.9  -7.6 
Minerals 18.9    18.8  17.9 
Oil -58.5    -58.5  -58.8 
Processed oil      -39.0  -39.4 
Services 5.1  3.2  5.0  4.2 
Transport equipment  -43.1    -43.1  -43.5 
Source: model simulation 
 
In the case of urban sector workers, the dominant force is the behavior of the services 
sector.  As its output increases, so does its demand for both unskilled and skilled labor.  
The infrastructure, agriculture and oil sectors are the main providers of unskilled labor for 
the services sector.  In the case of skilled labor, the main sources of workers flowing to the 
services sector are infrastructure, oil, processed oil, and agriculture. 
 
Firm’s income decreases 17.85% and all components of firm’s income contribute to this 
decrease.  Capital income falls 18.9% while transfer income decreases 16.3%. 
 
A similar situation happens in the case of households’ nominal income.  Total income for 
all household types decreases and the same is true for each of their income sources.   
Income losses decrease as we move up in the income distribution ladder.  Therefore, it is 
lower income households who suffer the biggest relative income losses, showing a 
regressive effect arising from the crisis.  Labor income, which is the most important income 
source among all household types, also shows the biggest relative decreases among low 
income households.  Meanwhile, transfer income exhibits a progressive behavior.  Its losses 
tend to be larger for high income households.  However, this result must be taken with care 
since it depends heavily on the assumption that remittances drop in the same proportion for 
all household types.  The reader is referred to the annex, where results from a “sensitivity 
analysis” are performed around this assumption.  They show that had different assumptions 18 
 
been made about the distribution of this shock among households, it is unlikely that the 
nature of the results presented here would be different. 
 
Table 11 shows percentage changes in households’ nominal income.  As follows from 
there, changes in labor income largely determine the outcome for total income.  This is so 
not only due to the relative importance of labor income, but also because there is relatively 
low variation among changes for all income sources. 
 
Table 11.  Percentage changes in households’ nominal income. Scenario impact of the 
crisis. 
 
Decile  Total income  Capital income  Labor income  Transfer income 
1 -17.5  -18.9  -17.7  -15.9 
2 -17.4  -18.9  -17.7  -15.8 
3 -17.4  -18.9  -17.6  -16.1 
4 -17.2  -18.9  -17.5  -15.7 
5 -17.1  -18.9  -17.4  -15.8 
6 -17.0  -18.9  -17.3  -16.0 
7 -16.8  -18.9  -17.0  -16.1 
8 -16.4  -18.9  -16.7  -15.6 
9 -16.1  -18.9  -16.0  -15.9 
10 -15.7  -18.9  -15.0  -16.2 
Source: model simulation 
 
The trade shock, as far as prices concerns, mainly consists of relatively sizeable decreases 
that induce price reductions in the economy.  At the consumer level, prices for all goods but 
machinery and equipment fall in the range from 4.4% to 38.8%.  In all, the consumer price 
index falls 14.5%, ameliorating the impact of the decrease in nominal income.  As a 
consequence, real income drops in the range from 1.2%, for households in decile 10, to 3%, 
for households in decile one.  These effects seem to be perfectly regressive as low income 
households systematically lose more than high income households. 
 
However, if a consumer price index is constructed for each household type, reflecting 
differences in their consumption baskets, a different picture emerges.  In this case, it 
follows that households in the lowest income levels lose the less as compared to households 
in higher income levels.  This, however, does not happen in a systematic way, as 
households in intermediate income brackets tend to face similar levels of loses and these 
are higher than the corresponding to low and high income households.  In this sense, the 
effects of the crisis (as modeled here) run against all household types, but tend to be harsher 









Table 12.  Percentage changes in households’ real total income. Scenario impact of the 
crisis. 
 
Decile  Deflated by general 
price index 
Deflated by own 
decile price index 
1 -3.0  -1.0 
2 -2.9  -1.7 
3 -2.8  -2.0 
4 -2.6  -1.9 
5 -2.5  -1.9 
6 -2.5  -1.9 
7 -2.3  -2.0 
8 -1.9  -1.8 
9 -1.6  -1.6 
10 -1.2  -1.4 
Source: model simulation 
 
Governmental income also decreases.  It does so by 18.1% and all sources of governmental 
income contribute to this decrease, as shown in Table 13, leaving their composition almost 
unchanged.  On the expenditure side, transfers made by the government decrease 14.5% 
while government expending in goods and services remains constant (it is exogenous in the 
model).  As a result, government savings turn negative, moving from a positive 5.8% of 
total governmental income to -6% of the new total governmental income. 
 
Table 13.  Percentage changes in government’s income. Scenario impact of the crisis. 
 
Item Change  (%) 
Total income  -18.1 
Capital income  -18.9 
Income taxes (households)  -16.0 
Income taxes (firms)  -18.9 
Taxes on production  -20.3 
Taxes on products  -20.7 
Import taxes  -18.8 
Transfers -16.3 
Source: model simulation 
 
Lastly, the GDP deflator falls 17.2%, leading to a nil real change in GDP (GDP at basic 
prices falls 17.3%). 
 
6.2  Adopted policies scenario 
 
As mentioned, the adopted policies scenario adds to the impact of the crisis scenario the 
main features of policy intervention for ameliorating the negative effects arising from the 
crisis.  In this case, policy intervention essentially rests on two pillars: higher foreign debt 
incurred in by the government and higher government spending in infrastructure.  The main 
characteristic arising from this scenario is that, compared to the impact of the crisis 20 
 
scenario, it smoothes the (negative) price response to the crisis.  Hence, it tends to lead to a 
“softer” adjustment of the economy with the implications that will be made evident below. 
 
Regarding trade impacts, policy intervention does not generate significant changes in terms 
of their size with respect to the impact of the crisis scenario, as can be appreciated from 
Table 14.  Quantities exported decrease slightly more when there are decreases and increase 
less when there are increases.  The same behavior is observed for export values.  In the case 
of quantities imported, imports decrease less when there are decreases and tend to increase 
more when there are increases (although this is not a generalized behavior as can be 
appreciated in the case of coal).  A similar trend is observed for import values.  As import 
values decrease for all sectors, in most cases the decrease is smaller when there is policy 
intervention.  However, this is not true in the cases of coal, machinery and equipment, oil, 
and transport equipment. 
 
Table 14.  Percentage changes in traded quantities and trade values. Scenario policy 
response. 
 
Sector  Quantity 
exported 
Export value  Quantity 
imported 
Import value 
Agriculture -1.9  -13.4  20.5  -10.1 
Chemical products  -4.7  -22.4  -4.3  -15.2 
Coal 6.0  6.3  17.5  -10.1 
Coffee 18.3  1.5  -19.3  -14.8 
Machinery and equipment  7.0  -2.0  -31.8  -25.1 
Manufactures -12.6  -36.8  -5.4  -16.6 
Minerals 24.5  29.0  -13.9  -42.4 
Oil -16.4  -50.3  -80.5  -67.1 
Processed oil  -10.8  -23.6  83.8  -16.4 
Services 8.3  4.1  -24.9  -24.9 
Transport equipment  -27.8  -43.4  -22.6  -25.3 
Source: model simulation 
 
The direction of these changes is consistent with two facts.  First, when there is policy 
intervention export and import prices decrease less when they decrease and increase more 
when they increase, due to the fact that higher foreign savings partly finance changes in the 
current account balance.  In fact, measured in relative terms, the current account deficit in 
the base year is equivalent to 15.6% of total trade, while it rises to 15.8% under the impact 
of the crisis scenario, and to 16.3% under the policy response scenario.  Second, the boost 
in demand for infrastructure helps in lowering the effect of the crisis on domestic prices, 
mainly those belonging to the sectors that provide inputs to the infrastructure sector.  As an 
average, prices for composite products (the CES combination of domestically produced and 
imported goods) go down by 17% under the impact of the crisis scenario and by 15.9% 
under the policy response scenario. 
 
Table 15 shows percentage changes in quantity supplied to the domestic market and in its 
market value.  As before, percentage changes arising from the policy response scenario do 
not differ much with respect to those arising from the impact of the crisis scenario.  The 
main exception to this is found in the obvious case of infrastructure.  Domestic supply of 21 
 
infrastructure decreases 7.4% less when there is policy intervention, reflecting the priorities 
that the government assigned for expending purposes.  For most of the remaining sectors 
the decreases are slightly higher and the increases are slightly lower, in a consistent way 
with the behavior of trade flows and prices. 
 
Table 15.  Percentage changes in quantities supplied to the domestic market and market 
values. Scenario policy response. 
 
Sector  Quantity 
supplied 
Value 
Agriculture -4.7  -20.4 
Chemical products  -0.8  -13.4 
Coal -3.6  -18.7 
Coffee 19.0  3.4 
Infrastructure -9.1  -24.0 
Machinery and equipment  4.9  -6.5 
Manufactures -2.5  -15.1 
Minerals -5.2  -41.9 
Oil -4.0  -28.0 
Processed oil  -20.5  -45.9 
Services 2.3  -12.4 
Transport equipment  -19.8  -23.1 
Source: model simulation 
 
Changes in market value tend to vary in a higher degree than under the impact of the crisis 
scenario.  The cases of infrastructure, coal, coffee, and mining are noticeable.  In the case 
of infrastructure changes are due, as mentioned, to increased government expending, while 
in the other cases it is the higher exposition of these sectors to international trade what 
drives the results (as domestic supply in these sectors is relatively small). 
 
The above implied changes in sectoral production determine the way labor demand changes 
at the sectoral level.  Table 16 shows the relevant figures.  With respect to rural unskilled 
workers demand, percentage changes for the two main demanders (agriculture and services) 
are almost the same as those found under the impact of the crisis scenario.  However, there 
is an expected redistribution of this type of labor among other sectors.  In particular, as 
compared to the impact of the crisis results, infrastructure increases its demand of this labor 
type at the expense of other sectors.  As for rural skilled labor, comparing with the impact 
of the crisis’ outcome, the main feature of the results is that the largest demanders (services 
and agriculture) show a marginally lower increase in demand for this labor type.  This is 
due to the fact that the infrastructure sector (the third largest demander of this labor type, 
although well below the first two) increases its demand, coming from a reduction of 30.6% 








Table 16.  Percentage changes in labor demand by sector. Scenario policy response. 
 
Sector  Rural unskilled  Rural skilled  Urban unskilled  Urban skilled 
Agriculture -5.8  -7.6  -6.4  -6.6 
Chemical products  -6.6  -8.3  -7.2  -7.4 
Coal 48.3    47.3  47.0 
Coffee 24.4  22.1  23.6  23.3 
Infrastructure -16.1  -17.7  -16.7  -16.9 
Machinery and equipment  6.6    5.9  5.7 
Manufactures -6.6  -8.3  -7.2  -7.4 
Minerals 18.1    17.3  17.1 
Oil -60.2    -60.4  -60.5 
Processed oil      -40.3  -40.4 
Services 4.6  2.6  3.9  3.7 
Transport equipment  -46.1    -46.4  -46.5 
Source: model simulation 
 
Regarding urban labor, the difference between the results attained under the scenario 
impact of the crisis and this scenario, is that urban unskilled labor is redistributed from all 
sectors in the economy towards the infrastructure sector.  Therefore, when there is policy 
intervention, demand for this labor type decreases more when there are decreases and 
increases less when there are increases for all sectors but infrastructure.  For the latter, 
demand for this labor type decreases less than before (a difference of 12.6 percentage 
points).  With respect to urban skilled labor, almost the same behavior is observed.   
Demand for this labor type decreases for most sectors, as compared to what is observed 
under the impact of the crisis scenario.  In the cases of infrastructure and manufactures it 
increases.  For the first, demand falls almost 17% (while it falls almost 30% in the previous 
scenario) and for the second 7.4% (the decrease under the previous scenario was 7.6%). 
 
Accordingly, nominal wages fall for all labor types.  Wages for rural unskilled workers fall 
17.6%, for rural skilled workers 9.4%, for urban unskilled workers 14.8%, and for urban 
skilled workers 14%.  Therefore, as in the former case, nominal wages for unskilled 
workers (rural and urban) fall the most, but now wage declines are lower than before for all 
labor types.  Nonetheless, the decrease in wage loses is modest for all labor types but urban 
unskilled workers.  For the former, wages decrease between 0.3% and 0.5% less and for the 
latter the decrease is 2.8% less.  This clearly is a consequence of the lower decrease in 
demand for this labor type in the infrastructure sector. 
 
Changes in wages importantly weight in the behavior of households’ nominal income, as 
labor income is their most important earnings source.  Table 17 shows percentage changes 








Table  17.  Percentage changes in households’ nominal income. Scenario policy 
response. 
 
Decile  Total income  Capital income  Labor income  Transfer income 
1 -16.4  -17.4 -16.7  -14.7 
2 -16.0  -17.4 -16.2  -14.6 
3 -15.8  -17.4 -15.9  -14.9 
4 -15.4  -17.4 -15.6  -14.6 
5 -15.2  -17.4 -15.3  -14.7 
6 -15.2  -17.4 -15.2  -14.9 
7 -15.0  -17.4 -15.0  -15.0 
8 -14.8  -17.4 -14.8  -14.5 
9 -14.7  -17.4 -14.5  -14.8 
10 -14.7  -17.4  -14.1  -15.1 
Source: model simulation 
 
Policy intervention lowers the decline in households’ total income across the board.  The 
highest improvements locate towards middle income households, making the changes less 
systematically regressive.  Capital income decreases less than before, due to the fact that 
now the rental rate of capital decreases less.  As follows from changes in wage levels, 
commented above, all households experience lower declines in labor income.  However, 
households with the largest shares of labor income coming from urban unskilled labor, get 
the highest improvements.  This happens to households in deciles four to eight.  Lastly, 
transfer income also falls less under this scenario and all households get about the same 
level of improvement. 
 
As done before, it is useful to have an idea of the impacts on households’ real income.  
Table 18 shows percentage changes in nominal income as deflated by the general consumer 
price index and by the own-decile price index.  From there, it can be appreciated that real 
income falls in all cases, except for deciles one and five when real income is calculated on 
the basis of own-decile price indexes.  In these cases there is practically no effect on 
household income. 
 
As compared with the results from the impact of the crisis scenario, real income, as deflated 
by the general price index, lowers less for deciles two to nine, while lowers more for 
deciles one and ten.  The differences between the two scenarios range from 0.1% to 0.7%.  
On the other hand, when real income is calculated according to own-decile price indexes, 
all households get improvements and these range between 1% and 1.9%.  The highest 
improvements belong to households in deciles three to eight. 
 
Therefore, government intervention effectively ameliorates the negative impact of the crisis 







Table  18.  Percentage changes in households’ real total income. Scenario policy 
response. 
 
Decile  Deflated by general 
price index 
Deflated by own 
decile price index 
1 -3.1  0.0 
2 -2.6  -0.2 
3 -2.4  -0.4 
4 -2.0  -0.1 
5 -1.8  0.0 
6 -1.8  -0.1 
7 -1.6  -0.2 
8 -1.4  -0.1 
9 -1.3  -0.2 
10 -1.3  -0.4 
Source: model simulation 
 
Firms income decrease under this scenario, but slightly lower than under the former.  Total 
firms’ income fall 16.4% (1.4% less than before), while its components, capital and transfer 
income fall 17.4% and 15%, respectively.  These results are less negative than before by 
2.1% and 0.4%. 
 
Government income falls too and does it 1.2% less than under the previous scenario.  All 
components of government income fall less than before.  The ones that change the least 
with respect to the impact of the crisis scenario are taxes on products and import taxes.  
Table 19 shows the relevant figures. 
 
Table 19.  Percentage changes in government’s income. Scenario impact of the crisis. 
 
Item Change  (%) 
Total income  -16.9 
Capital income  -17.4 
Income taxes (households)  -14.8 
Income taxes (firms)  -17.4 
Taxes on production  -18.8 
Taxes on products  -20.1 
Import taxes  -18.6 
Transfers -14.9 
Source: model simulation 
 
Lastly, GDP at basic prices falls 15.8%, 1.5% less than before, while the GDP deflator 
decreases 15.7%, yielding to a negligible decrease in real GDP.  Hence, in spite of policy 
intervention leading to some improvements for ameliorating the negative impacts of the 






7.  Comments on the Results and Conclusions 
 
This research attempts to appraise the effects of the international economic crisis and the 
ensuing policy response by the government on the Colombian economy.  While the 
transmission mechanisms of the crisis are complex and several of them are not readily 
amenable of appraisal through the analytical setting used here, some of the most important 
can usefully be modeled and their effects simulated by means of a computable general 
equilibrium model (CGE).  The same is true regarding the set of policy responses 
implemented by the government. 
 
We use a slightly modified version of the PEP-1-1 CGE model to simulate the effect of the 
drop in remittances and trade changes (prices and quantity changes) that the crisis brought 
upon the Colombian economy.  Similarly, the effects of policy response, in the form of 
higher indebtedness and reprioritization of governmental expenses, are assessed. 
 
Results indicate that lower remittances and trade changes do indeed have a negative impact 
on the economy, leading to negligible negative growth (after an important period of 
positive and sustained growth of the economy).  On the export side, trade behavior largely 
depends upon international price movements.  Most sectors experience shrinkages in export 
value and a few of them reap benefits.  On the import side, all sectors shrink in terms of 
prices and quantities and, therefore, of value.  Production destined to the domestic market 
also falls and so do prices. 
 
Wages decrease for all labor types, affecting the most unskilled labor in rural and urban 
areas (especially the former).  Decreases in labor demand follow for most sectors, layoffs 
being compensated by increases in labor demand from the sectors that expand production 
(due to exports behavior). 
 
As a result, nominal income decreases for all household types and so does real income.  
However, decreases in real income tend to be lower the higher the income level of the 
household, in a regressive fashion. 
 
On the other side, policy intervention plays a positive role.  First of all, it smoothes price 
response before the crisis and gives more flexibility to the current account. Second, while 
reducing the shrinkage in the infrastructure sector, it allows for a relatively important 
improvement in wages for urban unskilled workers.  Third, it improves real income for all 
households, although those in the middle of the income distribution benefit the most.   
However, its outcome in terms of GDP behavior is nil, calling into question the whole 
purpose of governmental intervention. 
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“Sensitivity Analysis” for Changes in Remittances 
 
As mentioned in the text, given lack of data about the behavior of remittances destined to 
particular household deciles, it was assumed in the simulations that all household types 
were affected in the same degree by the drop in remittances. Therefore, a uniform decrease 
of 14.4% was used across households.  Since this is quite an ad hoc assumption, it is useful 
to see how it affects the results obtained at the household level vis a vis different 
assumptions that could have been made on the way remittances changed. 
 
Two different ways of distributing the changes in remittances according to household type 
were used for this purpose.  First a regressive one, in which it is assumed that low income 
households were relatively more affected than high income households by the decline in 
remittances.  Second, a progressive one in which the opposite assumption is made.  The 
effects of both were estimated for the impact of the crisis scenario.  While other, perhaps 
more radically distributed, scenarios could have been used, the ones selected serve well the 
end of appraising the difference that it makes assuming a uniform distribution of the shock.  
Table A1, below, shows the percentage changes that were assumed in each case. 
 
Table A.1  Alternative assumed percentage changes in remittances. 
 
Decile Uniform  Regressive  Progressive 
1 -14.4  -100.0  0.0 
2 -14.4  -88.0  -0.7 
3 -14.4  -76.0  -2.8 
4 -14.4  -64.0  -4.9 
5 -14.4  -52.0  -7.0 
6 -14.4  -40.0  -9.1 
7 -14.4  -28.0  -11.2 
8 -14.4  -16.0  -13.3 
9 -14.4 -4.0  -15.4 
10 -14.4  -1.9 -17.5 
 
Table A.2 reproduces Table 11 in the text, showing the percentage changes in households’ 
nominal income arising from the impact of the crisis scenario with a uniform distribution of 
changes in remittances.  Tables A.3 and A.4 show the difference between this scenario and 
the other two (regressive and progressive distribution of the shock).  Figures in these tables 
should be interpreted as follows.  A positive number means that the regressive or 
progressive scenario leads to a smaller effect than the one used in the main text, while a 
negative number means the opposite.  The figures represent the difference in percentage 
terms.  For instance the -0.9 shown under total income for decile one under the regressive 
scenario, means that the latter yields a decrease in total income that is 0.9% larger, while 
the 0.2 in the same position under the progressive scenario means that the decrease in total 
income is smaller in 0.2%. 
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Table A.2  Percentage changes in households’ nominal income. Scenario impact of the 
crisis. 
 
Decile  Total income  Capital income  Labor income  Transfer income 
1 -17.5  -18.9  -17.7  -15.9 
2 -17.4  -18.9  -17.7  -15.8 
3 -17.4  -18.9  -17.6  -16.1 
4 -17.2  -18.9  -17.5  -15.7 
5 -17.1  -18.9  -17.4  -15.8 
6 -17.0  -18.9  -17.3  -16.0 
7 -16.8  -18.9  -17.0  -16.1 
8 -16.4  -18.9  -16.7  -15.6 
9 -16.1  -18.9  -16.0  -15.9 
10 -15.7  -18.9  -15.0  -16.2 
Source: model simulation 
 
Table A.3  Difference in percentage changes in households’ nominal income under the 
regressive scenario. 
 
Decile  Total income  Capital income  Labor income  Transfer income 
1 -0.9  0.0  -0.1  -6.1 
2 -0.9  0.0  -0.1  -6.6 
3 -0.8  0.0  -0.1  -5.1 
4 -1.0  0.0  -0.1  -4.7 
5  -1.3 0.0 0.0  -6.1 
6  -1.0 0.0 0.0  -4.3 
7  -0.4 0.0 0.0  -1.6 
8  -0.1 0.0 0.0  -0.2 
9  0.4 0.0 0.0 1.2 
10  0.5 0.0 0.0 1.5 
Source: model simulation 
 
Table A.4  Difference in percentage changes in households’ nominal income under the 
progressive scenario. 
 
Decile  Total income  Capital income  Labor income  Transfer income 
1  0.2 0.0 0.0 1.0 
2  0.2 0.0 0.0 1.2 
3  0.2 0.0 0.0 1.0 
4  0.2 0.0 0.0 0.9 
5  0.2 0.0 0.0 1.2 
6  0.2 0.0 0.0 0.9 
7  0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 
8  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
9  0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.1 
10  -0.1 0.0 0.0  -0.4 
Source: model simulation 
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From the tables it can be appreciated that the differences in total income changes are 
relatively small.  Under the regressive scenario they are larger but never go beyond 1.3% 
(in absolute terms).  In the case of the progressive scenario, the differences are small, 0.1% 
being the largest.  Results for capital income show no changes between alternative 
assumptions and for labor income there are small changes for deciles one to four under the 
regressive scenario.  As expected, differences in transfer income tend to be of significance 
in spite of remittances being only a part of total transfers. 
 
Differences in percentage changes for transfer income follow the direction of the 
assumptions made (either regressive or progressive in nature) and are larger (in absolute 
value) under the regressive scenario as a consequence of having smaller figures as a starting 
point.  Nonetheless, they lead to the larger differences in total income changes already 
mentioned above. 
 
In sum, use of other assumptions about the way changes in remittances may be distributed 
among household types, seems to yield moderate differences in income changes and, more 
importantly, does not introduce modifications in the nature of the results presented. 